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Effects of Reputation on the Legal Profession
Fred C. Zacharias*
Abstract
This Article considers how the reputation of lawyers and signaling
between lawyers and clients affects the impact of legal ethics rules. Academics
who have written about the relationships between lawyers and clients have not
adequately considered the influence of reputational signaling on who clients
hire and on lawyers'implementation of discretion. These empirical issues are
key to a proper analysis of many professional rules and to the approach bar
associations should take to matching lawyers and clients.
The Article will focus primarily on lawyers' reputations as a proxy for
what clients want, or need, to know about their representatives. Part I offers a
taxonomy of the ways in which lawyers' reputations are important. Part II
discusses what we do, and do not, know about lawyers 'reputations in today's
real world. Part 1X1 identifies a series of questions about reputation that
academics and the bar should consider more seriously than they have in the
past.
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I. Introduction
Before entering academia and teaching Professional Responsibility, I
practiced law as a criminal defense attorney representing indigent
individuals and as a public interest litigator suing officials of government
and other organizational entities. A faculty colleague who also teaches
Professional Responsibility represented exclusively corporate clients
through large, established law firms. Although we are good friends, we
rarely see eye to eye on what legal ethics should require and how effective
the legal ethics codes can be.
Lying at the core of many of our disagreements is the role that the
reputation of lawyers and signaling between lawyers and clients have in
determining the impact of the professional rules. In part, the divergence in
our views has to do with our backgrounds. When writing about legal
ethics, I typically am focusing on the relationship between individual
unsophisticated clients who know little about lawyers, defer to them
significantly, and depend on lawyer self-regulation and professional
discipline to ensure appropriate representation.' My colleague envisions
sophisticated corporate clients, who know what they want and actively shop
for counsel, and corporate lawyers willing to provide the desired service in
order to obtain large legal fees.2
The clients I am thinking of, at best, select their lawyers based on
vague word of mouth from a limited number of peers who tell them the
lawyers have done a good job in the past. When the potential clients visit a
1. The influence on legal ethics regulation of the paradigm of the unsophisticated,
indigent criminal defendant is discussed in Fred C. Zacharias, The Civil CriminalDistinction in
Professional Responsibility, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 165, 167-78 (1996).
2. See Fred C. Zacharias, The Images of Lawyers, 20 GEO J. LEGAL ETHIcS 73, 84-85
(2007) (discussing the paradigm of the lawyer as businessman).
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lawyer for the first time, they are unlikely to leave the lawyer's office
unrepresented, because the consumers do not have, or do not feel that they
have, alternatives and do not fully comprehend the differences among
lawyers and in how lawyers act. Once these clients retain counsel, they do
not expect to exert significant control over her.3
My colleague's clients and lawyers live in a different world. His
clients obtain references, study past results the lawyers have obtained,
interview prospective counsel, and let them know what they want to
achieve (and how).4 The lawyers, in return, let the clients know how much
they want the representation by adjusting their fees (or not) and signaling to
the clients how they will behave if certain eventualities arise. These clients
will know the lawyers' reputations for aggressiveness, cutting comers, and
willingness to oppose client demands.
The caricatures of clients and lawyers that my colleague and I conjure
up, while stemming from our experiences, are not necessarily
representative of the way all, or most, clients and lawyers act. To be
honest, we do not know for a fact how much of a role reputation and
signaling between lawyers and clients play in ordinary attorney
relationships outside our paradigms. The empirical issues are key to a
proper analysis of many professional rules.
This Article will focus primarily on one aspect of the equation:
lawyers' reputations as a proxy for what clients want, or need, to know
about their representatives. Part I offers a taxonomy of the ways in which
lawyers' reputations are important. Part II discusses what we do, and do
not, know about lawyers' reputations in today's real world. Part III
identifies a series of questions about reputation that academics and the bar
might do well to consider more seriously than they have in the past.
3. To avoid confusion, this Article will refer to lawyers as female and other actors as
male.
4. Some of these clients are so sophisticated that they may use their investigations of and
initial interviews with counsel as a tactic to create conflicts of interests when the clients'
adversaries and competitors attempt to consult the same counsel in the future. See, e.g., B.F.
Goodrich Co. v. Formosa Plastics Corp., 638 F. Supp. 1050, 1051-52 (S.D. Tex. 1986)
(involving a corporation that had interviewed a list of"outside prominent trial lawyers who had
experience in patent cases" and then moved to disqualify a lawyer not selected from
representing its adversary); cf MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 22 (2006)
(recognizing some prospective waivers of conflicts of interest designed to limit the effectiveness
of intentional efforts to create conflicts); Note, Prospective Waiver of the Right to Disqualify
Counsel for Conflicts of Interest, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1074, 1075 (1981) (discussing the use of
prospective conflict waivers as a potential antidote to tactical efforts to disqualify counsel).
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II. The Significance of Lawyers' Reputations
Most obviously, lawyers' reputations are important for clients
planning to hire an attorney. In the absence of mechanisms that publicly
grade attorneys,5 clients' means of selecting lawyers are limited to
reviewing the lawyers' objective qualifications (e.g., their educational
background), interviewing candidates, contacting references, and word of
mouth. The level of client sophistication ordinarily determines how a client
selects counsel. A client who is uninformed about which qualifications are
important and how to assess the qualifications cannot make good use of most of
the options. When there are costs associated with interviewing and evaluating
more than one attorney, that also may constrain a client's ability to perform a
meaningful personal evaluation.
Because of the importance of lawyers' reputations in the minds of
prospective clients, lawyers' desires to maintain specific types of reputation
have significant impact on the implementation of professional rules and other
legal constraints on lawyer behavior. To the extent reputation is dependent on
the way lawyers behave, or are likely to behave in particular contexts, that
affects the manner in which lawyers comply with the constraints. Consider
permissive professional rules that allow lawyers to take action against their
clients' interests under some circumstances-for example, to disclose
confidential information or report information to a governmental agency. A
firm with a reputation for always exercising discretion so as to maximize the
clients' interests (as opposed to third party or societal interests) obtains an
advantage in attracting clients who are willing to pay for that behavior and are
in a position to obtain accurate information about reputation.7
5. See Fred C. Zacharias, The Pre-employment Ethical Role of Lawyers, 49 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 569, 631-34 (2007) (discussing the possibility of developing formal mechanisms
for grading lawyers).
6. The costs may not only entail the expenditure of money and time investigating
prospective counsel, but also the psychological and emotional cost to some individuals of
discussing personal information with lawyers and reliving the negative experience that is the
foundation of the visit. Scholars have routinely assumed that many prospective individual
clients quickly become dependent on the first lawyer they meet and have difficulty treating the
initial discussions concerning representation as an arms' length transaction. See DOUGLAS E.
ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE 129 (1974) (studying New York personal
injury claimants suggesting that "[g]enerally speaking, clients choose the first lawyer they know
who comes to mind, the first lawyer recommended to them, or the first lawyer they meet"); John
V. Tunney & Jane Lakes Frank, Federal Roles in Lawyer Reform, 27 STAN. L. REv. 333, 338
(1975) ("Once in a law office door, the average citizen is a captive audience.").
7. See Fred C. Zacharias, Coercing Clients: Can Lawyer Gatekeeping Rules Work?, 47
B.C. L. REv. 455, 466-69 (2006) (discussing corporate lawyers' economic incentives in
implementing reporting and disclosure rules).
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Reputation plays a unique role in clarifying a lawyer's proclivities. A
lawyer or firm might not, for example, be willing to put into writing its
willingness to surrender discretion accorded in the rules8 because doing so
might be sanctionable 9 or might put the firm in disfavor with governmental
agencies administering the rules.' 0 For similar reasons, counsel is unlikely to
express the willingness directly to the client, particularly a client with whom
counsel has not previously dealt. Reputation is a method for signaling to
prospective clients the lawyer's or law firm's flexibility without risk.
Maintaining that reputation can be important to the lawyer's or firm's bottom
line.
Lawyers' reputations may affect the impact of mandatory professional
rules as well. Suppose, for example, lawyers compete for business among
corporate clients potentially affected by obligatory "reporting up"
requirements." The rules and enforcement of the rules, however, are not the
only incentives that influence lawyers,12 and a range of alternate ways to
remedy putative corporate misbehavior may be available.' 3  A lawyer's
reputation for implementing the reporting-up rule, employing internal review
8. See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Permissive Rules of Professional Conduct,
91 MINN. L. REV. 265, 280 (2006) (discussing whether lawyers have an option to guarantee
nondisclosure).
9. A disciplinary authority might take the position that the attorney has the obligation to
exercise discretion in every possible disclosure situation. It might also conclude that this
discretion must be exercised in light of the competing policy considerations underlying the
confidentiality rule and the exception. Recognizing this possibility, the drafters of the recent
California future crime exception included language that foreclosed discipline against an
attorney for invoking or declining to invoke the exception. See CAL. RuLES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 3-100(E) (2007) (providing that a lawyer "who does not reveal information permitted [under
the exception] does not violate the rule"); id. at discussion (stating that lawyer is "not subject to
discipline for revealing confidential information as permitted under this rule").
10. The SEC, for example, administers regulations governing lawyers pursuant to the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307 (2002).
11. See, e.g., Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 17
C.F.R. § 205.3(b) (2007) (requiring corporate attorneys to report up the ladder in certain
circumstances); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2006) ("[U]nless the lawyer
[who knows of potential misconduct] reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best
interest of the organization to do so the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in the
organization."); Zacharias, supra note 7, at 481-84 (discussing obligatory reporting-up
requirements).
12. See generally David McGowan, Why Not Try the Carrot? A Modest Proposal to
Grant Immunity to Lawyers Who Disclose Client Financial Misconduct, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1825
(2004) (discussing, from a game-theoretic perspective, lawyers' incentives in complying or not
complying with corporate disclosure obligations).
13. See Zacharias, supra note 7, at 464-66 (discussing options of different kinds of
lawyers responding to corporate misconduct).
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mechanisms instead of reporting to outside authorities, or routinely protecting
the lawyer's own interests in compliance (e.g., by writing internal opinions that
shift the burden of compliance but effectively require the client to take action)
can lead clients to select her from among lawyers with different approaches to
the rules.' 4 In situations in which clients uniformly, or mostly, prefer lawyers
who will disobey the letter or spirit of mandatory rules, the availability of
reputational signaling undermines the character of the rules.
There are, of course, different kinds of reputations. One important form,
for purposes of the legal ethics codes, is a lawyer's or firm's reputation for
responding to criticism, discipline, or sanction. As a practical matter, the
resources of disciplinary agencies are relatively meager, with the result that the
agencies tend to avoid imposing sanctions that will embroil the regulators in
lengthy and costly litigation. Historically, disciplinary agencies have shied
from implementing rules against prosecutors' offices 5 and legal advertisers,' 6
in part because those rules are legally controversial and tend to prompt a
vigorous defense.' 7  Discipline is imposed disproportionately on solo
practitioners and small firms, again in part because these defendants are least
likely to devote substantial resources to fighting sanctions. 18 For the same
14. See Richard W. Painter, Toward a Marketfor LawyerDisclosure Services: In Search
of Optimal Whistleblowing Rules, 63 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 221,253 (1995) (noting that "clients
can short circuit whistleblowing rules, and thus remove disincentives to engage in misconduct,
by hiring lawyers who will not disclose").
15. See Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REv.
721, 760 (2001) (discussing possible reasons for the infrequency of discipline of prosecutors).
16. See Fred C. Zacharias, What Lawyers Do When Nobody's Watching: Legal
Advertising as a Case Study of the Impact of Underenforced Professional Rules, 87 IOWA L.
REV. 971, 974-1002 (2002) (discussing reasons for underenforcement of legal advertising
rules).
17. The Department of Justice, for example, recently announced a policy that it will
defend its lawyers in disciplinary proceedings whenever the lawyers have made a "good faith
effort to understand their ethical requirements." DOJIssues Rule Detailing Mission, Functions
of Professional Responsibility Advisory Office, 22 A.B.A./B.N.A. LAW. MANUAL ON PROF'L
CONDUCT 21 (Jan. 11, 2006) (reporting the Department of Justice's adoption of a new rule that
requires federal prosecutors to obey state laws and rules that govern ethical conduct in the state
where the prosecutor practices).
18. See, e.g., California Bar Report Finds Lack of Bias Against Small Practices in
Discipline Matters, 17 A.B.A./B.N.A. LAW. MANUAL ON PROF'L CONDUCT 43-35 (July 18,
2001) (reporting that "[a]lthough only 23 percent of California lawyers are in solo practice, 54
percent of inquiries about attorneys involved solo practitioners, 68.47 percent of investigations
opened were for solo practitioners, and 78.37 percent of the completed disciplinary cases
involved those practitioners"); Leslie C. Levin, Preliminary Reflections on the Professional
Development of Solo and Small Law Firm Practitioners, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 847, 847-48
(2001) ("Lawyers who practice in [solo and small firm] settings tend to receive... substantially
more discipline than their big firm colleagues."); id. at 848 n.3 (citing multiple authorities on the
proposition).
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reasons, a lawyer's or firm's reputation for litigiousness in its own interests may
promote hesitant enforcement of the rules. This, in turn, may limit the effect of
the rules in precisely the contexts in which they are intended to have their
greatest impact.
Just as there are various kinds of reputation, a single reputation can have
multiple effects. A lawyer's desire to maintain a reputation for client-centered
behavior may, for example, encourage the lawyer to downplay third-party and
societal interests recognized in some professional rules, thus undermining these
rules. But the desire to maintain the reputation for client-centeredness may also
reinforce rules that forbid the lawyer to place her own interests ahead of a
client's, such as conflict of interest and fair dealing requirements.' 9 Thus, when
a lawyer operates in a field in which a reputation for client-centered behavior is
imperative to her ability to attract clients, the need for professional rules against
self-dealing (and even negligence) is diminished because the market will
enforce similar standards.2°
Various targets other than potential clients rely upon reputations.
Reputation is a mechanism for signaling to third parties the kind of approach a
lawyer is likely to take to her role, which itself may affect the resolution of
particular matters. The difference between an ultra-aggressive lawyer and a
lawyer who acts with detachment and objectivity may be significant for the
adversary or agency with whom the lawyer has regular dealings. 2' For
example, the IRS, SEC, prosecutors, and even judges may respond differently
19. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7-1.8 (limiting lawyers' abilities to act in
their own interests). The theory is that if sophisticated future clients will become aware of
lawyer self-dealing, then engaging in it ordinarily will not be cost effective. But, in practice, the
reputational concerns will not always dominate. If, for example, the client is unlikely, or
unable, to gauge the lawyer's reputation for acting in a self-interested manner, the market will
not serve as an effective deterrent. See Milton C. Regan, ProfessionalReputation: Lookingfor
the Good Lawyer, 39 S. TEx. L. REv. 549, 559 (1998) ("The desire for financial gain may
outweigh concern for reputation, for instance, when the client is relatively unsophisticated and
engages in only lenient oversight of outside counsel."). In addition, in individual cases the size
of the booty resulting from self-interested action may outweigh the lawyer's desire to maintain
her reputation.
20. Cf. Regan, supra note 19, at 558 ("[D]evotion to the client... has the common
function of constraining the operation of lawyer self-interest.").
21. See Richard W. Painter, Lawyers' Rules, Auditors' Rules and the Psychology of
Concealment, 84 MINN. L. REv. 1399, 1402-03 (2000) (discussing the relationship between
lawyers' reputation for disclosing information and regulators' likely response to the lawyers);
Zacharias, supra note 7, at 483 ("Conversely, a law firm's overall marketability may depend on
the reputation for independence that the firm establishes with regulators in the field in which the
firm practices."); cf. Robert Bone, Modeling Frivolous Lawsuits, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 519, 572
(1997) (arguing that, by hiring a lawyer with a reputation for "always investigating and filing
only meritorious suits, defendants can rely on that reputation to cure any informational
asymmetry that blocks early settlement").
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to positions taken by attorneys with reputations for exercising means or making
arguments that are reasonable than to positions taken by lawyers known to
stretch the law.22 Likewise, adversaries will respond differently to settlement
offers and statements made in negotiations, depending on their opponents'
reputations for candor and taking reasonable positions. 23 Rules that authorize
varying approaches to making arguments,24 settlement discussions, 25 and
engaging in borderline deceit or misrepresentation 26 thus will be implemented
differently by lawyers seeking to attract different kinds of clients.27
Not surprisingly, lawyers' interests in maintaining more than one kind of
reputation or in maintaining good reputations with a variety of targets can
produce inconsistent incentives. For instance, in order to maintain a reputation
for competence and professionalism with tribunals before whom a lawyer
repeatedly appears, the lawyer may be tempted to blame questionable conduct
22. See Richard W. Painter, Game Theoretic and Contractarian Paradigms in the Uneasy
Relationship Between Regulators and Regulatory Lawyers, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 149, 170
(1996) (arguing that attorneys who have proven to regulators that they screen their clients'
positions and take their obligations to monitor client misconduct seriously may receive
enhanced deference from the FCC).
23. See, e.g., Scott R. Peppet, Lawyers 'Bargaining Ethics, Contract, and Collaboration:
The End of the Legal Profession and the Beginning ofProfessional Pluralism, 90 IOWA L. REV.
475, 485 (2005) (analyzing a potential "reputational solution" to a bargaining problem, under
which parties can signal their willingness to cooperate by hiring an attorney with a reputation
for collaboration); Franz Xaver Perrez, The Efficiency of Cooperation: A Functional Analysis
of Sovereignty, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 515, 563 (1998) (asserting that a reputation for
integrity and trustworthiness strengthens a party's bargaining position over time); Robert B.
Wilson, Strategic and Informational Barriers to Negotiation, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT
REsOLUT1ON 108, 111 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995) (discussing costs and benefits of a
negotiator's reputation for truthfulness); Douglas H. Yam, Lawyer Ethics in ADR and the
Recommendations of Ethics 2000 to Revise the Model Rules of Professional Conduct:
Considerations for Adoption and State Application, 54 ARK. L. REv. 207, 270 n.269 (2001)
(arguing that a lawyer's reputation for truthfulness and fairness increases that lawyer's
effectiveness as a negotiator in future negotiations).
24. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (forbidding arguments only when
there is no "basis in law or fact ... that is not frivolous" and allowing all claims when there is "a
good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law").
25. See, e.g., id. at R. 4.1 cmt. (stating that "under generally accepted conventions in
negotiation" certain types of statements are "ordinarily not taken as statements of material fact").
26. See, e.g., id. at R. 4.1 (excluding from regulation misrepresentations that do not
involve statements of material fact, including "estimates of price or value" and "a party's
intentions as to an acceptable settlement"); id. at R. 8.4 (forbidding all dishonesty and deceit by
lawyers).
27. See, e.g., Regan, supra note 19, at 558 (discussing lawyers' different constituencies
and the different reputations each constituency demands).
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on a client.28 This in turn, may injure the client's position and undermine the
lawyer's separate reputation for client-centeredness among potential clients.
Likewise, it may be important for a firm to maintain a reputation for taking
moderate and reasonable positions before regulating agencies, because that will
produce more deference by the agencies. 29 A lawyer who practices before the
IRS, for example, has an interest in convincing the IRS that his positions
typically are justified by the legal merits and are not extreme. A defense
attorney who can build a relationship with prosecutors based on the
prosecutors' sense that the attorney will only seek assistance that is reasonable
(based on the confidential information within the defense attorney's control)
can develop an advantage in routine plea bargaining. But maintaining general
reputations for these characteristics may cost the lawyer in terms of her
reputation for pressing clients' interests in each case.
How lawyers implement the competing incentives depend in part on each
lawyer's balance of (1) what kind of lawyer she wishes to be, and (2) which
reputation is more important to her practice.30 It also depends on the nature of
the lawyer's clients. The hypothetical tax lawyer, for example, may confront a
mix of sophisticated clients all of whom are aware of the lawyer's reputation,
some of whom prefer a lawyer who will press their case to the limits, others of
whom prefer a lawyer with a good reputation before the IRS and are willing to
limit their positions to help the lawyer maintain that reputation, and yet other
28. See, e.g., Louis Fennell v. TLB Kent Co., 865 F.2d 498,500 (2d Cir. 1989) (reporting
a client's attempt to undo a settlement agreement because of his dissatisfaction with the
settlement amount and his lawyer's subsequent letter to the court requesting the "matter be
restored to the calendar as the settlement which was authorized and accepted by the client is no
longer acceptable to him").
29. See generally Painter, supra note 22.
30. Bradley Wendel has suggested that in joining an organization or law firm with a
reputation for ethical behavior, a lawyer shows a willingness to bear the cost of acting
consistently with that reputation because "it would result in greater long-run gains, as a result of
the lawyer's ability to attract clients who are looking for high-commitment lawyers." W.
Bradley Wendel, Regulation ofLawyers Without the Code, the Rules, or the Restatement: Or,
What Do Honor and Shame Have to do with Civil Discovery Practice?, 71 FORDHAM L. REv.
1567, 1614 (2003) (citing William H. Simon, Who Needs the Bar?: Professionalism Without
Monopoly, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 639 (2003)). Wendel states that:
Although lawyers sometimes assume that all clients are seeking attack-dog
advocates, many clients do recognize the value of being represented by a lawyer
who is known as a cooperator-namely, the additional credibility before courts and
third parties that the lawyer enjoys, which results in less expense for the client and
a greater likelihood of favorable judicial decisions where the judge has discretion in
how to rule.
Id.; cf id. at 1614-15 (noting "reasons why signaling mechanisms may not enable clients
seeking high-commitment lawyers to retain only those lawyers").
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(presumably lucrative) clients who expect lawyers with the favorable IRS
reputation to trade on that reputation while taking extreme positions on the
clients' behalf.31 The criminal defense attorney, in contrast, may represent
unsophisticated clients who mostly are unaware of her reputation with
prosecutors and thus do not rely upon it. In both situations, the lawyers
presumably will adjust their decisionmaking in a way that will emphasize the
reputation that has the most beneficial impact on their future businesses.
Existing (as well as prospective) clients may rely on reputation. Even after
selecting an attorney, clients have many decisions to make about how to use
that attorney. When, for example, a client is considering engaging in conduct
of questionable legality, the client must decide whether to consult the lawyer
(as opposed to forgoing advice, consulting in-house counsel, or engaging a
separate attorney), whether to give the lawyer information, and whether to
provide information in actual or hypothetical form.32  Because a lawyer
potentially can exert control over the clients' decisions in a variety of ways-by
providing a written opinion that particular conduct would be illegal or a
violation of the officers' fiduciary duties, by reporting the proposed conduct up
the ladder, by preventing a client from testifying or employing particular tactics,
or by disclosing or threatening to disclose misconduct to outside authorities-
the client must assess how important independence from the lawyer's influence
is and how to assure that independence. If the client is not in a position, or is
psychologically unable,33 to ask the lawyer directly how she would respond to
the situation, the lawyer's reputation for exerting control, or not, is the best
proxy.
When rulemakers understand the processes discussed above, the existence
of lawyer reputations and signaling of those reputations should influence not
only who clients retain and the impact of particular rules but also how the rules
are written in the first place. If different rule formulations are more susceptible
to circumvention, or to circumvention within particular categories of lawyers
31. See Painter, supra note 14, at 224 (noting that some clients may prefer lawyers "who
are recognized as whistleblowers by regulators, investors, and other third parties" because they
"lend credibility to clients who need it"); Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and
Law Firm Structure, 84 VA. L. REv. 1707, 1739 (1998) ("[C]lients can use large firms as
reputational intermediaries or signals of good behavior, by choosing firms that have a reputation
for honesty and fair dealing.").
32. See Zacharias, supra note 7, at 467-68 (discussing clients' options in using lawyers
who take differing postures toward reporting and disclosure rules); cf Painter, supra note 14, at
253 (discussing possible reactions of clients to whistleblower obligations on the part of
lawyers).
33. For example, because the client feels powerless before or dependent on the lawyer.
See supra note 6 and accompanying text (explaining how clients choose a lawyer).
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and clients, careful drafters must take those potential effects into account.
Information about lawyers' reputations can shed light on the degree to which
lawyers, or groups of lawyers, will care about and adhere to specific kinds of
rules and how they will implement regulatory leeway.
III. Who Knows What About Which Lawyers?
Thus far, this Article has focused on the relevance of lawyers' reputations
to various potential recipients of reputation information. It would be a mistake,
however, to treat all types of reputation the same. Some are more accurate (and
potentially deserving of respect) than others, some are accessible to only
particular kinds of clients, and some can be more easily signaled to potential
recipients. Because these differences can be significant for how regulations of
lawyers should be formulated, it is important to spell out the differences.
Reputations are developed in two main ways. They can be earned,
through performance that is reported in some relatively neutral way or observed
and recounted by people (e.g., lawyers) qualified to judge the performance.
Alternatively, reputations can be manufactured, either by a lawyer herself or by
a third party (e.g., a legal magazine) that has a financial or other incentive to
publicize particular perceptions about the lawyer.
The characterization of reputation as earned or manufactured does not
automatically determine how accurate a reputation is, who can access it, and
whether it should be meaningful. Nevertheless, understanding how reputation
develops is a starting point for identifying its impact. The following subparts
thus first identify the different sources for reputation and then consider how
those sources affect the manner in which reputation is and should be
emphasized.
A. Earned Reputations
The sources for earned reputations typically are previous clients, other
lawyers, and (sometimes) evaluating institutions that collect information from
third parties, including solicited and unsolicited references. These sources are
of varying reliability. Only some former clients are capable of understanding
what comprises good performance. Prior clients may not be able to translate
the relevance of performance in one kind of case to the demands of a different
kind of representation.34 The more legally sophisticated and experienced a
34. Thus, for example, a previous client who is satisfied by the result in his case may
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client is, the greater the likelihood that he will produce an accurate and
meaningful evaluation of the lawyer's performance.
In contrast, lawyer-evaluators usually have the ability to assess the
performance and quality of other lawyers, at least when they have had sufficient
opportunity to observe performance. Several factors can undermine the
usefulness of lawyer evaluation, however. First, as discussed below, there are
various attributes of representation that lawyers value differently. Some
lawyers may determine quality of representation based on a track record of
loyalty, others on a track record of results, and yet others on a track record of
professionalism or civility. Any lawyer evaluation therefore must be probed in
order to be useful. Second, lawyer references may be biased, in either
direction. When an evaluating lawyer knows the evaluated lawyer and has had
legal experiences with her, personal reactions often will color the assessment.
Third, if the evaluating lawyer is a competitor, his evaluation may be
influenced by the desire to steal the business. In the corporate context, where
the client typically depends on house counsel as evaluator, economic incentives
also may affect the evaluation; 35 house counsel often refer business to their
incorrectly attribute the result to his lawyer's performance or may attach more significance to
the lawyer's bedside manner than to his advocacy. The client also may have no basis for
determining whether the good performance of the lawyer in his matter (say, a real estate closing)
reflects a likelihood that the lawyer will perform well in the subsequent different matter (for
example, litigation). The client nonetheless may recommend the lawyer on the general sense
that the lawyer did a good job for him. See, e.g., ARK. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.2(e)
(2005) (prohibiting the use of clients or former clients from being used in any manner in legal
advertising); FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-7.2(b)(l)(E) (2007) (prohibiting the use of
testimonials in legal advertising); id. cmt. (noting that testimonials and endorsements are
"inherently misleading"); IND. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.2(d)(3) (2007) (prohibiting the
use of testimonials); William E. Hornsby, Jr., AdRules Infinitum: The Needfor Alternatives to
State-Based Ethics Governing Legal Services Marketing, 36 U. RICH. L. REv. 49, 65 (2002)
(noting that the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct limit client testimonials because of
the fear that such testimonials create "unjustified expectation[s]"); William Hornsby, Clashes of
Class and Cash: Battles from the 150 Years War to Govern Client Development, 37 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 255, 277-78 (2005) (describing criticism by the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice of advertising rules which prohibit client testimonials); Frederick C. Moss, The Ethics of
Law Practice Marketing, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 601, 620-21 (1986) (noting that the bar's
reluctance to allow testimonials stems from a fear of potential clients' naivet6 regarding
advertising).
35. See Susan Saab Fortney, The Billable Hours Derby: Empirical Data on the Problems
and Pressure Points, 33 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 171, 188-89 (2005) (discussing approaches of
general counsel in reducing fees charged by outside firms); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H.
Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry into the Corporate
Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REv. 313, 382 (1985) ("General counsel
and other top corporate executives are becoming much more sophisticated about the process of
buying legal services."); Carl D. Liggio, Sr., A Look at the Role of Corporate Counsel: Back to
the Future-Or Is it the Past?, 44 Aiuz. L. REv. 621, 632 (2002) ("As law firms lose more and
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former firms based on a tacit continuing relationship between the referring lawyer
and the firm.
3 6
There are several kinds of purportedly independent or objective evaluating
institutions that can contribute to a lawyer's or firm's reputation. Lawyer referral
agencies, for example, sometimes collect information about the competence of
lawyers they include in their service-including experience information and
letters of recommendations from other lawyers and judges.3 7 By qualifying a
lawyer as a specialist in a field, the referral agency to some extent vouches for the
lawyer's competence. Sophisticated consumers will understand that the agency's
evaluation is limited and that it speaks mainly to the fields in which a lawyer
practices rather than to the quality of representation she provides. Less
sophisticated consumers, however, may read more into the referrals.
Other "rating" organizations exist. Martindale-Hubbell, for example,
evaluates lawyers and assigns them grades based on experience and references.
3 8
more partners to senior roles in the corporate legal department ... it will place a greater number
of individuals who know the dirty little secrets of law firm billing in the hands of the clients.").
36. See Abraham Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law
Firm, 37 STAN. L. REv. 277,277 (1985) (contrasting modem entrepreneurial house counsel with
old form of general counsel whose "responsibilities... were confined to corporate
housekeeping and other routine matters and to acting as liaison (perhaps a euphemism for
channeling business) to his former firm"); Deborah A. DeMott, The Discrete Roles of General
Counsel, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 955, 970-71 (2005) (discussing the increasing independence of
general counsel in shopping for representation); cf Eric Herman, Perelman Wins $604.3 Mil.
From Morgan Stanley, CHi. SuN-TiMES, May 17, 2005, at 61 (detailing a case in which Morgan,
Stanley & Co. lost a big verdict when represented by a law firm engaged by general counsel
who was a former partner in the firm).
37. See, e.g., Chi. Bar Ass'n, General Panel Application, http://www.chicagobar.
org/public/attomey/referral/applgen.asp (last visited Oct. 3, 2007) (requiring three letters of
reference from other lawyers to register with Chicago's lawyer referral service general panel)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Houston Lawyer Referral Serv., Inc.,
Application for Panel Membership, http://www.hlrs.org/signupform.asp (last visited Oct. 3,
2007) (requiring two recommendations from attorneys for registration with Houston's Lawyer
Referral Service) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); L.A. County Bar Ass'n,
Lawyer Referral and Information Service, http://www.smartlaw.org/vlris/lrisqual/index.
cfin?fuseaction=ViewLRISApplication (last visited Oct. 3, 2007) (requiring three letters of
recommendation from attorneys or judges, Martindale-Hubbell rating, or membership on a
section of the Los Angeles County Bar to register with Los Angeles' Lawyer Referral and
Information Service) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
38. See Martindale.com, Peer Review Ratings-The Process, http://www.martindale.com
/xp/legal/AboutMartindale/Products and Services/PeerReviewRatings/ratings.xml (follow
"Process" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 26, 2008) (describing the ratings process) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Zacharias, supra note 5, at 631-32 (discussing
the usefulness of rating publications like Martindale-Hubbell). A lawyer listed with Martindale-
Hubbell is either unranked or ranked CV, BV, or A V. Martindale.com, Peer Review Ratings-
Explanation, supra (follow "Explanation" hyperlink). Ifa lawyer is unranked, it is because that
lawyer is newly admitted to the bar, requested to not have any ratings published, failed to meet
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Although these services may be accurate to a point,3 9 liability and other concerns
limit their objectivity. Lawyers who are unsatisfied with their ratings may opt
out.4° Objective criteria that do not necessarily reflect quality of performance,
such as length of membership in the bar, are emphasized. 41 Primary sources-
the references that are used to produce the evaluations-are not available to the
consumer.
B. Manufactured Reputations
Earned reputation may exist but never be available or sought by clients.
Wealthy, experienced, and sophisticated clients often will understand how to
identify earned reputation and will make the effort to identify the reputations of
potential counsel. Inexperienced or untutored consumers, in contrast, may not
know where to look or what information is important. If these potential clients
seek earned reputation information, they are likely to rely on word of mouth
from friends, colleagues, and other individuals who have had limited
experience in evaluating lawyers.
Lawyers therefore have an opportunity to capitalize on the vacuum in
information by publicizing themselves, in an effort to create a favorable
reputation. The most common mechanism is legal advertising designed to
present the lawyer's experience and qualifications in the best light and as
established fact. Yellow page and media advertisements, for example,
either or both of the requirements, or was disbarred or suspended. Id. The V designation
indicates a lawyer has met the requirements for the General Ethical Standards rating, which
must be satisfied before a lawyer may be otherwise rated. Id. The Legal Abilities rating range
from C to A, with C being the lowest satisfactory rating. Id. The ratings depend heavily on
when a lawyer was admitted to the bar. Id. A lawyer admitted for three to four years can obtain
up to a CV, a lawyer admitted for five-to-nine years can obtain up to a BV. An A Vrating is only
achievable by a lawyer admitted for ten years or more. Id.
39. Even purportedly independent rating publications may build in inaccuracies by
assigning ratings based on insufficient information. See, e.g., Complaint, Browne v. AVVO,
Inc., 525 F. Supp. 2d 1249 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (No. CV7-920) (alleging that an online rating
service allows lawyers cooperating with the service to boost their ratings while penalizing
lawyers who do not wish to participate or do not cooperate), available at
http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/washington/wawdce/2:2007cv00920/144356/
1/ (last visited Dec. 11, 2007) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also
Browne v. AVVO, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 2007 WL 4510312 at *3 (W.D. Wash. 2007)
(dismissing the complaint on first amendment grounds but stating: "To the extent that
[plaintiff's] lawsuit has focused a spotlight on how ludicrous the rating of attorneys (and judges)
has become, more power to them").
40. See Martindale.com, Peer Review Ratings, supra note 38 (follow "FAQs" hyperlink)
(stating that lawyers may request not to have any rating published).
41. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (describing the rankings system).
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frequently characterize lawyers' characteristics (e.g., "aggressive," "pit bull,"
"heavy hitter"), 42 bolster lawyers' reputations with unsolicited or purchased
testimonials,43 and refer to past successes (real or imagined)" as a means of
establishing the lawyers' competence and quality.
45
In recent years, electronic matching services have offered themselves as
middlemen, purporting to help consumers identify lawyers with qualifications,
experience, and quality as a substitute for personal client investigation of
earned reputations. 46 Some of these services may perform meaningful
42. See, e.g., Carl Jones, Pit Bull Lawyers Reprimanded by Fla. Bar, DAILY Bus. REv.,
Apr. 10, 2006, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id= 1144414533046 (reporting
discipline of lawyers who advertised themselves as "pit bulls"); Glenn Puit, "Heavy Hitter" Will
Sue, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., Mar. 2, 2006, at 1A (reporting a dispute between the Nevada Bar and a
lawyer over his use of the term "heavy hitter" in his advertising).
43. See, e.g., Zacharias, supra note 16, at 983 (describing lawyer advertisements using
testimonials in the San Diego yellow pages).
44. See id. at 982-83 (describing lawyer advertisements referring to past successes in the
San Diego yellow pages).
45. A controversial modem phenomenon has been the rise of publications that purport to
compare lawyers and designate some as superior-using such labels as "Super Lawyer" or "Best
Lawyers in America." See Advertising May Tout "Super Lawyer" Listing and Other Ratings
that Meet Certain Criteria, 23 ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUALON PROF'L CONDUCT407 (Aug. 8,
2007) (discussing ethics opinions addressing whether lawyers may cite their own designations
in these publications in the lawyers' own advertising.).
46. See, e.g., Tex. Sup. Ct. Professionalism Comm., Ethics Op. 561 (2005), reprinted in
68 TEx. BAR J. 1037 (2005) (finding attorney participation in online matching services to be
impermissible advertising and solicitation in violation of TEx. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT 7.03(b) (2005)). Cf Texas Committee Gives QualifiedApproval For Participation in
Online Matching Service, 22 A.B.A./B.N.A. LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROF'L CONDUCT 455
(Sept. 20, 2006) (reporting Texas's modification of Op. 561 so as to allow some internet
matching services). The regulators have had some difficulty deciding whether to characterize
these services as potentially unlawful lawyer referral services or as legal advertising, because
they have elements of both. See, e.g., Letter from Federal Trade Commission to W. John
Glaney, Chairman, Professional Ethics Committee for the State Bar of Texas (May 26, 2006),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/05N060017CommentsonaRequestforAnEthicsOpinionImage.pdf
(last visited Oct. 4, 2007) (asking the Texas Professionalism Committee to clarify its ruling on
matching services and advocating allowing internet matching services because they are useful to
consumers and foster economically healthy competition); Geri Dreiling, Surfing for Lawyers:
FTC endorses Online Legal Matchmaking, 5 No. 29 A.B.A. J. EREPORT 4 (July 21, 2006)
(discussing the conflict between the FTC's concerns about competition and the Texas
disciplinary agency's concerns about legal ethics). The regulators also have had to come to
grips with whether particular web sites and publications provide a valuable service in finding
lawyers suitable for their particular cases or merely serve as advertising vehicles for the benefit
of the lawyers. See David L. Hudson, Jr., Ratings War: New Jersey Opinion Against 'Super'
and 'Best' Listings Riles Publishers, 5 No. 31 A.B.A. J. EREPORT 1 (Aug. 4, 2006) (discussing
N.J. Comm. on Attorney Advertising, Op. 39 (2006), which prohibits lawyers from advertising
their standing as "super lawyers" in a published lawyer ratings survey); J.T. Westermeier, Ethics
and the Internet, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 267, 294-95 (2004) (discussing state regulatory
bodies that have wrestled with the ethical issues that arise when attorneys use online lawyer
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evaluations of the lawyers they list and, in fact, reflect earned reputations.47
Others simply list self-identifying lawyers and limit the number of lawyers
listed, based on their willingness to pay for the service. a For the most part, the
matching services are designed to identify the qualifications of lawyers to
handle particular types of cases rather than to identify how those lawyers will
approach the cases or the professional rules.
It is important to note that most forms of manufactured reputation target
particular categories of potential clients, mainly potential clients who have
limited resources for identifying the characteristics of prospective lawyers on
their own. Large law firms rarely advertise-at least not in the traditional
sense 49 -because their clients are likely to seek firsthand information. Because
lawyers need to instigate or participate in the development of the manufactured
reputation, the universe of lawyers about whom manufactured reputation
information is available will be limited.
Manufactured reputation evidence ordinarily will be self-serving. Both
because of its goals and the legal limitations on what may be included, legal
advertising typically is short on facts. 50 It attempts to create a feeling about the
matching services). Cf Karen Donovan, Street Scene: Some Lawyers Ranked 'Super'Are Not
the Least Bit Flattered, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2006, at C6 (discussing publication that lists
"super lawyers" in twenty-one states).
As discussed in Zacharias, supra note 5, at 638-40, some states allow lawyers to obtain
contingent referral fees simply for helping clients find a suitable lawyer. In these jurisdictions,
the referring lawyers can be viewed as serving a function as informed middlemen evaluating
prospective lawyers on the behalf of clients.
47. See supra note 38-40 and accompanying text (describing the Martindale Hubbell
rating system).
48. Prompted by new advertising rules adopted by the New York courts, the New York
State Bar Association's Committee on Standards of Attorney Conduct recently adopted a new
standard stating that "a professional rating is not 'bona fide' unless it is 'unbiased and non-
discriminatory,"' and requiring the use of "objective criteria or legitimate peer review in a
manner unbiased by the rating service's economic interests." New York State Bar Parts Ways
with ABA on Disclosure of Fraud, Screening, 23 ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROF'L
CONDUCT 581, 582 (Nov. 14, 2007).
49. Elite law firms do advertise, but through less traditional vehicles, such as newsletters,
brochures, seminars, and personalized presentations to clients. See Zacharias, supra note 16, at
1007 n. 160 (discussing advertising by large firms).
50. Legal advertising rules often prevent references to past successes or the use of
terminology that suggests the quality of the lawyer, on the basis that such advertising is
inherently misleading. See, e.g., ARK. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.1 (d) (2006) (describing
testimonials or endorsements as false or misleading); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6158.1 (2006)
(presuming any message as to the result of past cases to be false, misleading, or deceptive); CAL.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1-400 Standard 1 (2005) (presuming any guarantee or prediction of
results of representation to be misleading); FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 4-7.2 (b) (1) (B)
(2006) (prohibiting any reference to past successes or results obtained); IND. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT 7.2(d) (2) (2005) (prohibiting legal advertising from containing information based on
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lawyer in question and to create name-recognition, rather than to provide
information. Counter-advertising by competitors is rare.
For purposes of illustration, consider the significance of a lawyer's
past achievements in the various forms of reputation. How a lawyer has
acted in previous cases of a similar type and the results the lawyer has
achieved (and under what circumstances) probably should be important to a
potential client. Yet those are fact-sensitive issues. Unless a client is in a
position to inquire specifically about prior results, and knows the questions
to ask, result information may be meaningless: Large recoveries may have
resulted from default judgments, easy fact patterns, or the ineffectiveness
of opposing counsel; a high percentage of victories or settlements may
reflect a lawyer's practice of demanding too little. Manufactured
reputation ordinarily skirts those issues, hoping that the consumer will be
persuaded by the surface facts. A consumer can follow up with questions
about the results if those are important to him, but only a client who
recognizes the issues will do so. Even an intelligent consumer may have
difficulty interpreting the data about past success.5'
C. Kinds of Reputations
Suppose a potential client asks for help: "I need a good lawyer to
handle my matter. Whom do you recommend?" David Luban, long ago,
illustrated the existence of many perspectives regarding the meaning of
"good lawyer" for purposes of legal ethics.52 For purposes of reputation,
however, the term has an altogether different universe of possible
interpretations. Each will be of significance to different targets of
reputation.
One meaning may simply be "competent"-qualified by training and
experience to handle a particular matter. This probably is the meaning
past performances).
51. Compare, for example, the real estate context. A realtor may develop a reputation for
success in selling houses, but in reality be achieving that reputation by systematically listing
housings at too low a price. See STEvEN D. LEvrrr & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKoNoMics 5-7
(2005) (discussing the economic realities of real estate sales). A sophisticated real estate
consumer (or evaluating agency) might be able to identify the inadequate listings by matching
them against comparable listings and sales. Id. at 7. In the legal context, however, the
consumer ordinarily has no "comps" against which to match the lawyer's past successes,
because even routine cases often turn on idiosyncratic facts and circumstances.
52. See generally THE GOOD LAWYER (David Luban ed., 1984) (presenting an anthology
of different perspectives on the lawyer's ethical roles and what it means for a lawyer to be
good).
65 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 173 (2008)
emphasized by lawyer referral organizations and independent publications
evaluating lawyers. It reflects an attempt to match clients and lawyers in a
superficial sense, identifying a group of practitioners who have some
knowledge about the field.
When the potential client asks the question, however, he probably
wants more tailored information. Yet it is clear that different clients will
consider varying attributes important in qualifying a recommendation as
good. Thus, for example, the shy and unsophisticated client who fears the
prospect of dealing with a lawyer but has only a limited sense of how
lawyers differ in the product they provide most likely will equate quality
with service orientation. Is the lawyer likeable? Does she have a good
bedside manner? Will she return phone calls and treat the client with
respect?
At the other extreme, corporate and other sophisticated clients are less
likely to be persuaded by personality. As rational actors, they may consider
potential lawyers' reputation for cost. But sophisticated clients ordinarily
are prepared to negotiate the cost issue, based on market considerations.
Their quest for the "good lawyer" probably will focus primarily on the
lawyers' reputation for other specific characteristics important to them.
Particularly if their search for representation is conducted by in-house
counsel, sophisticated clients will have some idea of the kind of service
they need. Sometimes good service will consist of highly aggressive
representation, other times it will require a soft negotiating touch or an aura
of respect that regulators or particular judges admire. In advice contexts,
the client may simply want the smartest and best-qualified lawyer who will
provide the best possible objective counsel-including advice that the
client is wrong and should give up its position 53--or, in contrast, the client
may desire a client-oriented lawyer who will find a way to accomplish
53. See generally Fred C. Zacharias, Lawyers As Gatekeepers, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REv.
1387 (2004) (discussing ways lawyers prevent clients from engaging in misconduct or taking
self-destructive positions). It is important to note that sophisticated clients, for psychological
reasons (including ego), may or may not be receptive to lawyers who disagree with them or tell
them off. When Elihu Root made his famous observation that "half of the practice of a decent
lawyer consists in telling would-be clients that they are damned fools and should stop," he was
reflecting on his experience with sophisticated clients. 1 PHILLIP C. JESSUP, ELIHU ROOT 133
(1938); see also RICHARD W. LEOPOLD, ELIHu ROOT AND THE CONSERVATIVE TRADITION 18
(Oscar Handlin ed., 1954) (discussing Root's "business" clientele).
In contrast, unsophisticated, individual clients are more likely to value a friendly bedside
manner and an advocate who seems to take the client's side as an ally and friend. See supra
note 34 and accompanying text (describing the lawyer's role); see also Charles Fried, The
Lawyer As Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060,
1065-76 (1976) (describing the lawyer's role in terms of friendship).
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management's desires, regardless of the wisdom or legality of the result.
The key for these sophisticated clients is that they know what they want,
know what questions to ask about lawyers they might hire, and have the
resources to obtain and evaluate the information.
Judges, regulators, and bar-related evaluators may attribute yet another
meaning to goodness. Certainly in evaluating judicial candidates, most
evaluating committees are heavily influenced by candidates' history of
"professionalism." Lawyers might be evaluated similarly. Are they
respectful of others, civil in dealings with the bar, involved in professional
activities, mindful of the rules that govern lawyers, and free of the taint of
disciplinary sanctions? Indeed, regulators might consider the good lawyer
to be the opposite of the person some clients would consider good. A
judicial or quasi-judicial officer, for example, may deem the best lawyers to
be those who take only reasonable positions, screen their clients' desires,
and incorporate the decisionmakers' needs.54 The client, in contrast, might
expect the good lawyer to press every possible claim to the hilt.
What is clear is that targets of reputation may seek a variety of
attributes, and the characterization of a lawyer as qualified or good will not
always deliver the information the client wants or needs. In Milton
Regan's terms, "the ideal of the good lawyer contains elements in potential
tension, whose salience may differ depending on the specific practice
setting in question." 55 Clients are not all the same in their capacity to
(1) identify what characteristics are important; (2) assess a lawyer's
possession of the characteristics; (3) assess reputation information; and
(4) search for and find pertinent information. The least capable clients are
both handicapped in ascertaining facts and the most likely to be misled by
any reputation information they obtain. Sophisticated clients will be able
to ask the questions that help them accurately identify lawyers with
reputations for the specific characteristics they desire.
D. The Accuracy of Reputations
This Article has already noted that not all reputation information is equally
accurate. Manufactured reputation tends to be less objective than earned
reputation, but the quality of earned reputation can be uneven as well. Because
54. See, e.g., Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1983) (identifying a lawyer's
function as including screening the positions the client desires to take); see also Painter, supra
note 21, at 1399 (discussing expectations regulators may have of lawyers before them).
55. Regan, supra note 19, at 550.
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manufactured reputation is tailored by the lawyer herself or the institutional
manufacturer for the purpose of encouraging clients to hire the lawyer, it is
inherently suspect. Manufactured reputation often encompasses self-reporting
by or self-evaluation of the attorney. The factual premises underlying
manufactured reputations ordinarily will not be available for testing.
In the case of both manufactured and earned reputations, the accuracy of
the reports given to the potential client (or other target) will depend
significantly on the evaluation abilities of the person making the
recommendation or on whom the recommender relies. Reputations stemming
from lawyer or judicial evaluators may be more accurate than reputations
developed by lay consumers of legal services. But that is true only to the extent
that the recipient can understand the significance of the reputation-whether
the reputation reflects qualifications, quality of service previously delivered,
personality, or professionalism.
E. Signaling and Its Effects
At one level, the mere existence and maintenance of a particular reputation
represents a signal about the lawyer. The lawyer may not need to do more in
order to convey to the client how she will act or respond to ethical constraints in
particular circumstances.
Let us suppose, however, that additional information is required-either
because a client wants it or because the general reputation is insufficient to
enable firm predictions about behavior. It is here that the differences among
clients will be most significant. Sophisticated clients will know what is
important for their representation. They will know what questions to ask (both
of the lawyer and her references). And they will often be in a position to
interpret the information they receive. Individual and inexperienced clients
may know little more than that they desire good representation.
A lawyer's desire, or willingness, to provide signals about her approach to
legal matters may depend on the client's ability to impose consequences for the
lawyer's failure to live up to her reputation. Clients can impose consequences
in a variety of ways. Repeat clients with fee-generating cases can withdraw
future business. Some clients can damage their lawyers' future reputations
among potential clients who are members of their community. Clients in
visible cases can send their own signals of satisfaction or dissatisfaction.56
56. See infra note 110 and accompanying text (noting that it may be possible for the
profession to develop mechanisms that facilitate signaling through information supplied by
former clients).
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The most obvious distinction is between the power of a large corporate
client, at one extreme, and the power of a beleaguered individual criminal
defendant, at the other. A lawyer's ability to obtain future business ordinarily
will depend upon her satisfying the first client, but not the latter.57 This
calculus changes in highly publicized cases, however; a lawyer may
aggressively pursue the client's interests in a publicized matter (e.g., an O.J.
Simpson case) even if the client is indigent and unsophisticated because the
client's dissatisfaction may become known to prospective clients through the
media.
Consider a situation in which the professional rules grant lawyers
discretion, the exercise of which may be important for the client's future. Most
codes, for example, allow lawyers to disclose certain confidential information
and, in the organizational context, allow lawyers to report information up the
ladder instead of pursuing other remedies for potential misconduct.58 Let us
further suppose that the client (corporate or individual) possesses, or will
possess, confidences that the lawyer might be able to disclose or report under
these permissive rules. The general reputation of the lawyer is insufficient to
allow a firm prediction that the lawyer will keep the information secret.
The sophisticated client will understand that this may become an issue and
ask the lawyer what she would do, perhaps in a hypothetical scenario. The
lawyer who is both concerned with obtaining the business and keeping the
client happy will know that the issue may be of significance to the client, so she
may steer the initial discussion to the subject of permissive disclosure.
Although the lawyer may not be able or willing to promise secrecy or
nonreporting, she can point the client to previous cases in which she has been
aggressive on the client's behalf. She may even provide references.
If the client is unsophisticated, however, the lawyer usually has an
incentive to keep the client in the dark. Keeping the disclosure option open
will give the lawyer power over the client later on, should an issue arise.59
Especially if the client is unlikely to be a recurring client and is not in a position
to spread negative information about the lawyer's practices among the lawyer's
future client population, the lawyer may place less of an emphasis on pleasing
the client ab initio.
57. The practices of many criminal defense attorneys, for example, depend largely on
court appointments that do not depend on client satisfaction.
58. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (describing the up-the-ladder reporting
model).
59. See Zacharias, supra note 7, at 499 (noting that individual clients will be "most prone"
to coercion by lawyers to act in particular ways).
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It is important to notice what these scenarios suggest for the permissive
professional rules. It is unlikely that the drafters intended the discretionary
provisions to be used as a means for some lawyers to attract business in
exchange for bartering away discretion. More likely, the rulemakers had in
mind an introspective process under which, in each situation covered by a
permissive rule, a lawyer would weigh the factors underlying the rule and the
exception; in other words, balance the factors militating in favor of disclosure
against the valid systemic and client-centered concerns that favor maintaining
confidentiality. 60 The ability of lawyers and clients to negotiate about the
matter, using reputation and other methods of signaling, undercuts the
effectiveness of most permissive rules in protecting societal interests that the
client does not share.6
Reputational signaling to adversaries and third parties often is more
difficult, except at the extremes. How is an administrative agency, for example,
able to discern a lawyer's reasonableness? Typically, this reputation must be
developed through experience with the agency. It cannot be manufactured.
Sometimes, however, a lawyer can signal her approach to an adversary
directly. She might say, for example, "I will negotiate within the range of
reasonable results, so long as you do the same. But if you take an unreasonable
position, I will litigate this case to the hilt."62 This, of course, is a threat, not a
signaled reputation. But the threat has relatively little value if the adversary
does not perceive it to be real. A lawyer's ability to point to past cases in which
the threat has been honored can be significant.
60. See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics, 74
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 59 (2005) (suggesting that confidentiality exceptions require a balancing
based on "professional conscience" that incorporates the spirit of the rules). There may be some
permissive provisions, however, in which the code drafters really do intend to accord lawyers
unfettered discretion because those rules implicate mainly lawyers' own interests, rather than
those of the clients, third parties, or the legal system. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 8, at
298-99 (discussing various justifications for different permissive rules).
61. See Regan, supra note 19, at 550 (noting that "concern for reputation provides more
protection against lawyer misconduct for clients than it does for third parties").
62. Cf ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 27-54 (1984) (suggesting
that a sequential strategy in which a bargainer adopts his opponent's bargaining approach tit-
for-tat can ultimately lead to a cooperative strategy by negotiators); 1 KEN BINMORE, GAME
THEORY AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: PLAYING FAIR 194-203 (1994) (analyzing the Axelrod
conclusions); Peppet, supra note 23, at 516 ("[I]t is not at all clear that tit-for-tat dominates
other strategies, nor, by analogy, that problem-solving will, over time, do better than hard-
bargaining.... [M]uch depends on the initial distribution of strategies across a population [of
lawyers].").
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IV Learning About Reputation
Not everyone will be sanguine about the various uses of reputation.
Certainly, the implementation of reputation as a mechanism for circumvention
of professional constraints on lawyers is troubling. Nevertheless, the various
effects of reputation information cannot be wished away. For society to make a
reasoned decision about its capacity to respond to these effects, it must first
assess the nature and magnitude of reputation's impact and then identify the
quarters in which the impact comes into significant play.
A. What We Should Know for Writing and Enforcing the Professional Rules
For a variety of practical and psychological reasons, ethics code drafters
typically rely on fictions.63 The drafters may be experienced in the realities of
practice but they write the codes, in part, to put a good public face on the bar. 64
The codes, and discussions of reforms, tend to assume that most lawyers act
professionally, desire to serve the public, and obey code mandates-both strict
and the hortatory mandates. The cynical view that lawyers' actions often are
driven by competition and personal, financial, or even venal considerations,
while understood, is rarely discussed openly or made a foundation of ethics
rules. Thus, when the code drafters accord lawyers discretion to serve moral or
societal interests, 65 to protect client interests over their own,66 and to screen
client activities, 67 the drafters often posit a fictitious world in which lawyers
63. See generally Fred C. Zacharias, The Future Structure and Regulation of Law
Practice: Confronting Lies, Fictions, and False Paradigms in Legal Ethics Regulation, 44
Aiz. L. REv. 829 (2003) (discussing fictions employed in legal ethics regulation).
64. There are many reasons for this perspective. Conceptualizing lawyers as professionals
makes the drafters feel good about themselves. It may engender trust among clients. Most
importantly, perhaps, it may help forestall external regulation of the profession, a goal the code-
drafting bar has long pursued. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 110 (2001) ("To
the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their professional calling, the occasion for
government regulation is obviated. Self-regulation also helps maintain the legal profession's
independence from government domination.").
65. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (1)-(3) (providing permissive
exceptions to attorney-client confidentiality); id. at R. 2.1 ("In rendering advice, a lawyer may
refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political
factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation.").
66. See, e.g., id. at R. 1.7(a) (2) (ordinarily prohibiting representation when "there is a
significant risk that the representation.., will be materially limited... by a personal interest of
the lawyer").
67. See, e.g., id. at R. 3.3(a) (3) ("A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence.., that the
lawyer reasonably believes is false.").
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honor the drafters' expectations of honest introspection and independent
judgment, clients do not influence lawyers' objectivity, and lawyers do not care
about the effect of implementing discretion on their ability to compete for
business.
In practice, this Article's analysis of the interaction between rules and
reputational signaling suggests the following. If analyzed on a purely economic
(or "rational actor") basis, the likely effect of promulgating permissive
professional rules is to create "strategy space" in which competitive lawyers can
play "reputation games., 68 In other words, permissive rules enable lawyers to
decide whether to signal consumers their intention to obey or disregard
discretion granted in the rules. Conversely, in the abstract, promulgating
mandatory requirements or prohibitions eliminates the strategy space because
lawyers must concede that they, like their competitors, are bound to a particular
course of conduct. The degree to which mandatory rules have this effect,
however, may depend both on whether the rules contain implicit discretion that
actually allows different responses to the rules (e.g., prosecutors must serve
justice)69 and whether the rules are enforced sufficiently to inform lawyers that
the requirements or prohibitions are meaningful.7 °
Here is a thought experiment. Suppose the code drafters decided to
address the real world. What would they need to learn about lawyers and the
role of reputation in order to write meaningful rules and set the stage for
enforcement?
We have already noted that reputation is used in several different ways.
To the extent reputation information is the only mechanism through which
some clients can learn about potential lawyers, the drafters should want to
ensure the accuracy of reputation evidence. In part, that is what they seek to do
68. This phraseology is that of my colleague, Professor David McGowan.
69. Many of the professional rules, while technically not permissive, acknowledge a range
of choice. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 8, at 277 n.55 (arguing that some rules grant
discretion implicitly "by allocating authority to lawyers to make a category of decisions without
specifying the limits on that authority"). These include rules that say nothing about a subject,
rules that require lawyers to act in a certain way "unless" certain factors are present, rules that
grant general authority to lawyers to act without specifying how, and rules that are simply too
vague to identify particular courses of conduct.
70. Rules governing advertising for legal services, for example, are clear and mandatory.
Yet because they are rarely enforced, many lawyers are willing to disobey these rules. See
Zacharias, supra note 16, at 995-96 (discussing lawyers' willingness to violate the legal
advertising rules). Lawyers have a history of circumventing other rules that are underenforced,
such as the rules requiring reporting of lawyer misconduct, prohibiting the assumption of
clients' costs in class action cases, and calling for the expedition of litigation, as well as
unenforceable rules, such as the requirement that prosecutors serve justice. See id. at 997-1001
(discussing underenforced and unenforceable rules).
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by imposing constraints on manufactured reputations, particularly reputations
manufactured through legal advertising. Bar limitations on manufactured
reputations, however, should be developed in light of real facts about clients'
alternatives for obtaining information about prospective representation. If
particular types of clients have no access to other forms of reputation, code
limitations on manufactured reputations may worsen the problem of insufficient
information. The absence of accurate information might justify loosening
advertising rules and hoping the market (including counter-advertising) will
produce better results.7' Alternatively, the absence of information might
provide a compelling reason for the bar to get into the business of educating
potential consumers, gathering and disseminating accurate reputation
72information on its own, 2 or focusing disciplinary resources on attorneys who
misstate their qualifications.
Suppose, after collecting data, the bar determines that individual
consumers selecting lawyers rely too much on inaccurate manufactured
reputation information because they have no easy access to earned reputation
information. One scholar has suggested that the bar could fill the vacuum by
hosting a website dedicated to each lawyer in which clients could post feedback
and discuss their experiences with that lawyer. 73 Some bar associations actually
have done the opposite-prohibiting attorneys from posting testimonials by
prior clients on their websites74-a policy that derives from a realistic fear that
lawyers will select from among client comments and post only the favorable.
If, however, lawyers were required to identify the bar-hosted website in all
retainer agreements (i.e., telling clients that they can post feedback after the
71. See Colleen Petroni, Comment, Third-Party Ratings as Modern Reputational
Information: How Rules of Professional Conduct Could Better Serve Lower-Income Legal
Consumers, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 197, 226 (2007) (arguing that because "many people do not
have access to firsthand referrals to assist them in finding lawyers... rules of professional
conduct should be revised in order to allow states to better evaluate and promote legitimate
third-party rating systems").
72. See Zacharias, supra note 5, at 631-40 (outlining possible mechanisms for bar
involvement in providing consumers with information about lawyers).
73. David McGowan, Legal Ethics Forum: State Bar Websites and Reputational
Feedback (June 4, 2006), http://legalethicsforum.typepad.com/blog/2006/06/state bar websi.
html (last visited October 15, 2007) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
74. ARK. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.1 (d) (2005) (treating a lawyer's communication
as false or misleading if it contains a testimonial); OHIO CODE OF PROF'L RESP. DISCIPLINARY
RULE 2-101(A) (3) (2003) (prohibiting the use of client testimonials in any public
communication); TEx. DISCipLINARY RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.02 cmt. 4 (2005)
(prohibiting testimonials from past clients); cf Joan C. Rogers, New York Proposes Sweeping
New Limits on Lawyer Advertising, Including InternetAds, 22 A.B.A./B.N.A. LAWYER MANUAL
ON PROF'L CONDUCT 318 (June 28, 2006) (reporting New York's proposal to forbid the use of
all testimonials).
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representation is concluded), the danger of self-selected testimonials would be
minimized. Surprisingly, perhaps because of a fear of defamation liability, no
jurisdiction has implemented this or any other informational forum that focuses
seriously on lawyers' reputations.75 Typically, bar associations limit themselves
to developing referral services that rely on objective qualifications alone.76
Before pursuing any course, the bar truly needs to understand how
particular communities of clients find counsel. At a minimum, collecting
information about the use of manufactured reputations can inform the bar about
which communities need assistance in obtaining meaningful reputation
information. Such data would enable code drafters to understand when
idealistic restrictions on advertising help and when they conflict with clients'
abilities to identify and choose appropriate representation.
The drafters also ought to become more interested in reputations that
affect lawyer's responses to the professional rules. Before adopting permissive
ethics provisions, for example, code drafters should want to assess the extent to
which lawyers exercise discretion based on personal incentives, rather than
based on the spirit of the rules. In other words, the drafters should be
concerned with the extent to which the rules actually have an impact other than
creating the competition games discussed above.77 That is not an easy analysis,
however. If the bar surveyed lawyers directly, they all would claim good faith
in implementing the professional standards. In fairness, it might be difficult for
75. Issues relating to the risk of liability, however, appear to have been worked out
reasonably well by nonlawyer internet sites that depend on feedback to protect consumers, such
as e-Bay.
76. There are, of course, practical issues that would need to be worked out. For example,
competitors may be tempted to supply negative comments, a problem that might demand some
editorial oversight and control. Clients may risk waiving attorney client privilege through their
commentary, an issue that might necessitate the provision of appropriate disclaimers and advice.
More serious may be the objection that client observations and reports are inherently
misleading and inaccurate, because clients do not understand what good performance by lawyers
really is. Especially if the lawyers discussed on the site have a right to respond, consumers
reading the reviews may have difficulty gauging whether a lawyer or former client is writing
accurately. See Eric Goldsmith, Comment to State Bar Websites and Reputational Feedback
Posting (June 4, 2006), http://legalethicsforum.typepad.com/blog/2006/06/state-bar
websi.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2007) (questioning the practical viability of the feedback
option) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). My intuition is that, while single
clients may assess their reputation inaccurately, on average a group of former clients will gauge
performance fairly well. The feedback mechanism also will have the side benefit of encouraging
lawyers to discuss with disappointed clients the reasons for the disappointing results. If,
however, bar regulators are convinced that clients truly are unable to assess their lawyers'
performance, that is more reason for the bar to develop alternatives to the market for delivering
meaningful reputation information to consumers.
77. See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text (discussing the formulation of
permissive rules and their likely effect of creating "reputation games" among lawyers).
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lawyers to even answer the question of how they balance competing
considerations in the abstract, in the absence of the pressures imposed by the
existence of actual clients and concrete consequences of the lawyers' actions.
Nevertheless, it should be possible to gather evidence regarding lawyers',
or categories of lawyers', reputations for exercising discretion objectively
because reputation evidence would come from third parties and be based on
past conduct. The results might not be uniform throughout the bar. As this
Article has suggested, different categories of attorneys probably respond to
grants of discretionary authority in a variety of ways. While one might
speculate that large-firm corporate attorneys and criminal defense counsel
emphasize client-orientation most, that currently remains an unresolved
empirical question--one to which the code drafters should know the answer
before formulating rules. Only with a firmer grasp of the facts regarding
various lawyers' reputations for ceding or selling objectivity can the drafters
make informed choices about whether to avoid particular permissive
provisions, narrow the range of discretion, or accord different options for
lawyers practicing particular kinds of law or with particular kinds of clientele.
More importantly, empirical evidence would inform the regulators regarding
any need to enforce the rules rigorously within specific categories of practice,
which may in turn call for the formulation of rules lending themselves to
78enforcement in those categories.
Mandatory code provisions present a different conundrum. Depending on
how they are drafted and enforced, professional mandates can deter
misconduct. They also can incorporate messages that serve as valuable public
relations tools; for example, prosecutors must serve justice and lawyers may not
accept cases in which their personal interests conflict with client interests. The
presence of strict ethics rules help fend off external regulation.79 It enables the
bar to attribute lawyer malfeasance to the occasional bad actor who disregards
the profession's standards.
78. See Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Codes: Theory, Practice, and the
Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 223, 251-55 (1993) [hereinafter
Specificity] (discussing the relationship between the phrasing of professional rules and their
enforceability); Fred C. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 36 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1303, 1367 (1995) [hereinafter Reconciling Professionalism] (discussing
mechanisms for making particular rules more enforceable).
79. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (asserting that evidence supporting the
claim that having rules of ethics helps avoid government regulation lies in the preamble of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct). Indeed, in some contexts, the U.S. Supreme Court has
explicitly relied on the potential for discipline as a grounds for avoiding further regulation of
lawyers. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976) (declining to hold prosecutors
subject to civil legal action partly on the basis that prosecutorial misconduct is deterred by the
potential for professional discipline).
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Yet, if such rules are to be meaningful deterrents, the drafters again need
information. To what extent do lawyers really fear mandatory rules? Lawyers
will not, and perhaps cannot, respond to that question in a meaningful way
when asked directly. Their actions and their reputations, however, can provide
clues to the answer. Some empirical evidence already suggests that lawyers'
desire to attract clients often trumps their willingness to follow mandatory legal
advertising rules.80 Similarly we have seen in the corporate context that
reputational signaling between clients and lawyers can undermine the
requirement that lawyers remedy potential corporate misconduct.8' Rather than
promulgate rules based on abstract images of how lawyers respond to
professional constraints, 82 the drafters would do well to collect concrete
information about whether particular kinds of mandatory rules produce, or are
likely to produce, compliance and the degree to which the level of the rules'
enforcement affects the rules' influence on lawyer behavior.83
How do these conclusions translate into actual regulation? Milton Regan
has suggested that reputational concerns sometimes serve as a disciplinary
force. 84 To carry his analysis one step further, code drafters should consider the
possibility that the existence of reputational concerns obviates the need for
some traditional rules that target categories of lawyers already concerned with
maintaining reputations consistent with the rules.85 Thus, for example, lawyers
80. See generally Zacharias, supra note 16 (analyzing lawyer responses to legal
advertising rules on an empirical basis).
81. See Zacharias, supra note 7, at 474-86 (analyzing the practical impact of lawyer
reporting rules in the corporate context); cf. Zacharias, Specificity, supra note 78, at 256 (noting
that, in the prosecutorial context, the requirement that prosecutors serve justice is mandatory but
written so vaguely as to limit the impact of the codes).
82. In the past, the code drafters have relied on a variety of images of lawyers, ranging
from lawyers as businessmen to lawyers as self-sacrificing, introspective professionals. See
Zacharias, supra note 2, at 75-85 (cataloguing and discussing the various images of lawyers).
83. It has already been demonstrated empirically that lawyers fail to obey even mandatory
legal advertising rules and that this has negative effects on professional regulation as a whole.
See Zacharias, supra note 16, at 1005-12 (discussing the ramifications of not enforcing ethical
rules). Likewise, it would not be surprising to find as an empirical reality that, despite the
existence of rules in some jurisdictions allowing corporate lawyers to disclose or report
corporate misconduct to regulating authorities, few have ever actually disclosed a company's
confidences.
84. Regan, supra note 19, at 559.
85. Cf Ribstein, supra note 31, at 1714-15 (noting that a lawyer's desire to maintain a
reputation for trustworthiness among clients may be prompted by economic demands as well as
by the existence of professional rules); Wendel, supra note 30, at 1568 ("[T]here are non-legal,
generally informal mechanisms available by which lawyers control one another, from within the
profession, rather than relying on formal, legal, externally imposed systems of rules."). But see
id. at 1590-91 (noting reasons why reputation might not be as effective in controlling lawyers as
other persons, including the fact that what is considered honorable on the part of lawyers in one
200
EFFECTS OF REPUTATION ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION 201
of sophisticated clients arguably will keep client confidences regardless of
whether the rules require it, so long as the clients who can assess lawyers'
reputations desire it and the lawyers will not be penalized for keeping secrets.8 6
The lawyers also will naturally satisfy other client-centered principles-such as
avoiding conflicts of interest, communicating with clients, and deferring to
clients' choices regarding objectives and important means-because failing to
do so would negatively affect their reputations among potential clients who can
inform themselves about reputations. In contrast, lawyers who deal with clients
who are not repeat players or clients who cannot readily obtain information
about lawyers' propensities for client-orientation have incentives to decide
whether to maintain confidences or other client interests on a case-by-case
basis.87 These lawyers may even seek to adjust the existing decision-making
authority in their own favor.8 8
The existence of reputational signaling in some circles, therefore, might
cause the drafters to downplay the importance of client-centered behavior in
those circles, but not in others. In other words, there may be less need to fortify
confidentiality principles in the corporate context-indeed, society's true
interest may lie in creating incentives for lawyers operating in that context to
89
exercise discretion in the direction of disclosure. In contrast, in the
representation of the unsophisticated individual client, the opposite may be
true. The dichotomy can justify varying approaches in the basic confidentiality
jurisdiction may be considered dishonorable in another).
86. See McGowan, supra note 12, at 1833-37 (analyzing the ways in which lawyers'
competing incentives will determine when and whether they implement a confidentiality
exception).
87. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing the incentive for lawyers to
keep the disclosure option open when dealing with unsophisticated clients).
88. Thus, for example, lawyers for unsophisticated clients may include provisions in their
retainer agreements that grant the lawyers authority to make certain decisions ordinarily vested
in clients or to settle a case at certain levels in the lawyers' discretion. In the corporate context,
in contrast, lawyers often will not even want decision making authority because that will have
effects on when and how their sophisticated client will use their services. See Zacharias, supra
note 7, at 466-74 (discussing when lawyers would want the authority to coerce corporate clients
to act in a particular way).
89. Indeed, Professor William Simon has suggested that modem developments effectively
have already eliminated corporate attorney-client confidentiality. William H. Simon, After
Confidentiality: Rethinking The Professional Responsibilities of the Business Lawyer 1
(Columbia Law Sch. Pub. & Legal Theory Working Paper Group, Paper No. 119, 2006),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=924409 ("The bar's claims about corporate confidentiality
are at best unsubstantiated and at worst fraudulent .... Corporate confidentiality is
dead.... "); see also Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy: The Mythology of the
Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 69 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 157, 159 (1993) (arguing in favor
of abolishing attorney-client privilege for corporations).
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rules and rules governing organizational lawyers. It may justify distinctions in
other areas of regulation as well.
It is important not to overstate these conclusions. Even lawyers for
sophisticated clients sometimes have incentives to preserve reputations for
independent, objective behavior. Ronald Gilson has suggested that
transactional lawyers in large firms create value for both their clients and
themselves by serving as intermediates between opposing clients90 and, in
effect, providing a reputational bond for the warranties their clients make.9'
Lawyers cannot charge a premium for providing this service if they are
perceived as a shill for their clients.92 Likewise, lawyers who appear before the
same judges and regulators may depend upon their reputations for honesty or
fair dealing in order to obtain good results.93 These lawyers might act
aggressively for clients but would not lie to third parties or regulators even if
the rules did not forbid representation. The same is likely to be true for most
lawyers who practice in a regime in which they must deal with repeat players.
The importance of identifying the hard facts about reputations is
highlighted by a conundrum Gilson poses. Let us assume that lawyers, or at
least some lawyers, value the opportunity to act as gatekeepers of client
misconduct. In a competitive world, Gilson asks why clients ever would allow
lawyers to serve the public interest over their own.94 Gilson responds that
"perfect socialization is one answer";95 if all lawyers automatically declined to
consent to client control, lawyers would have the upper hand. Alternatively,
Gilson posits that some mechanism might prevent clients from "finding those
90. Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side
Perspective, 49 MD. L. REv. 869, 872 (1990) (noting that "important elements of professional
standards serve to cast lawyers in the role of enforcers of agreements among clients").
91. See generally Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills
and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239 (1984) (discussing the value of business lawyers in
reducing transaction costs in negotiations); Karl S. Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of
Lawyers, 74 OR. L. REv. 15 (1995) (refining Gilson's hypotheses).
92. Okamoto, supra note 91, at 23 ("By joining in the client's assurances, [lawyer]
intermediaries stake their reputations on behalf of the client. The client in turn pays for this
service in the form of premium billing rates or commissions charged by the higher reputation
firms.").
93. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation
and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 509, 565 (1994) ("Litigators
are profoundly concerned about their reputation with judges and are typically very hesitant
about doing anything to damage their reputation with a judge before whom counsel is likely to
appear many times in the future.").
94. Gilson, supra note 90, at 888.
95. Id. at 889.
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lawyers who will provide the desired service 9 6 or that uncertainty about the
quality of lawyers might prevent clients from unduly emphasizing the
gatekeeping issue in the selection process.9 7 Gilson, however, concludes that,
over time, "information asymmetries" have decreased because, among other
reasons, sophisticated clients have learned to use in-house counsel to select
representation and these in-house counsel are in a position to assess both
quality and reputation.98 This, essentially, has shifted the power in the
relationship to the demand side of the equation.
Gilson's analysis, however, focuses only upon corporate practice,99 and it
reaches speculative (though highly plausible) conclusions about the lawyer
selection processes.'0° Even under Gilson's analysis, reputation is a significant
element in the process. The nature of the selection process among clients who
do not have the resources of the in-house counsel is unclear.
It therefore remains important for purposes of regulating sophisticated and
unsophisticated clients alike for the code drafters to know, or at least to develop
an accurate intuition about, when reputations matter to lawyers and what the
desired reputations are. Even in the absence of empirical evidence, it is clear
that some lawyers value a reputation for extreme loyalty to clients, others value
a reputation for objectivity, and yet others emphasize a reputation for fair
dealing or the willingness to acknowledge third party or regulatory concerns.
Moreover, because lawyers value multiple reputations, which reputation they
will emphasize may depend on context-with the nature of the case, the nature
of the client, and the extent of the short and long-term rewards for making a
particular selection. The existence of these variances suggests that code
drafters cannot realistically predict the impact of their regulatory efforts without
a refined understanding of how and when reputations come into play.
Providing an empirical basis for regulating with a view to lawyers'
practical incentives rather than ideals to which the drafters assume the bar
aspires can be especially valuable because code drafters themselves often come
from a segment of the bar that is interested, in an academic sense, with
96. Id.
97. Id. at 899.
98. Id. at 902-03.
99. Other academic works that address the effects of reputation on client behavior on
client and lawyer decision-making similarly focus on the corporate context. E.g., McGowan,
supra note 12; Painter, supra note 14; Ribstein, supra note 3 1.
100. Interestingly, Gilson points to the use of sophisticated house counsel for selecting
external representation as a key reason why clients are able to select lawyers on their terms.
There are, however, some agency risks in relying on house counsel, including their natural
inclinations to select lawyers with whom they have dealt in the past or with whom they maintain
an implicit, mutually beneficial understanding (e.g., mutual praise to the nonlawyer officers).
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professional responsibility issues. These drafters tend to expect that other
lawyers share their interest and thus write the rules with their own concerns in
mind. When, for example, code drafters adopt a discretionary future harm
exception to confidentiality, they typically assume that the rest of the bar shares
their concern with third party and societal interests and that lawyers sometimes
are willing to forfeit competitive benefits to safeguard those interests.
Empirical information about lawyers' reputations, however, might show the
contrary-that many lawyers do not care about external interests at all.' 0 , Such
information is a prerequisite to a reasoned decision on whether lawyer self-
regulation, or particular aspects of self-regulation, makes sense.
B. What We Should Know in Order to Assist Clients in Obtaining Valid
Reputation Information
This Article has already noted the important ways in which clients
(particularly potential clients), adversaries, and regulators rely upon reputation
information. Yet that information is not equally available to all participants in
the legal system, nor can different types of clients receive equally accurate
information. In some ways, the legal ethics codes interpose roadblocks to the
dissemination of reputation information.1
0 2
If we are willing to accept a world in which reputation information serves
important functions in the selection and use of counsel, the information
arguably should be made as accurate and available as possible.10 3 To the extent
the professional codes depend upon lawyers adhering to the professional rules
and assume that clients sometimes seek lawyers who adhere, the bar has yet
101. Regan, supra note 19, at 555 ("[T]he commitment to preserve a certain kind of
reputation is not determined by individual character. It also will be shaped in important ways
by... the pressures, incentives, and rewards that attend upon being known as a certain kind of
person.").
102. The codes, for example, limit legal advertising, communications in the context of
client solicitation, and the ability of lawyers to communicate with represented parties about their
attorneys.
103. In discussing the ways lawyers' reputations affect the ability of adversaries and the
legal system as a whole to react appropriately to frivolous lawsuits, Robert Bone notes:
[A] reputation mechanism is viable.., only when conditions are favorable to the
formation of a reputation market .... An effective reputation market also requires
clients who know the reputations of different law firms and can shop around. Large
corporate clients are likely to fit this profile, but individuals are not. The desire to
attract corporate business might be enough inducement for some firms to compete
over reputation, but not firms, such as the plaintiff's tort bar, that specialize in
representing individuals.
Bone, supra note 21, at 573.
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another interest in facilitating the development of reputation information.' 04
Before the bar can support the dissemination of such information, however, it
needs to gather empirical evidence regarding clients' methods of obtaining and
using reputations.
This Article, for example, has only been able to speculate about how
clients receive information about lawyers. It would be useful for regulators to
know not only which clients seek background information about potential
representatives but also where clients look. To what extent do potential
clients-and which potential clients-consult publications about lawyers and
rely on references, news reports, or word of mouth? More importantly, how do
they consult the sources? Do they consult only friends or also other objective,
knowledgeable sources?
Equally important in designing a mechanism for the development of useful
information about lawyers is identifying the attributes that potential clients, of
differing types, deem important in hiring and using attorneys. Are clients
actually seeking information about relevant characteristics? To the extent the
evidence shows that categories of clients desire particular kinds of useful
information but have difficulty obtaining it, the bar might initiate or support
information-delivery services; 10 5 how easy the development of such services
will be may depend on the characteristics that the clients consider significant.
In contrast, if the evidence demonstrates that particular kinds of clients do
not understand what qualifications of lawyers are important, that would suggest
a need to at least require lawyers to discuss their qualifications and possible
alternative representation at the retainer stage.10 6 Alternatively, the bar itself
could respond by developing mechanisms that identify and explain the
significance of lawyers' training and experiential qualifications-through bar
referral or information services or by supporting the work of independent
publications in gathering the pertinent information. Providing information
about the quality of lawyers' past performance would be more difficult, but it is
conceivable that courts and bar associations might get into the business of
grading attorneys.I°7
104. There is a variety of possible mechanisms. This Article has already mentioned the
development of a bar-hosted feedback site for all lawyers. McGowan, supra note 73.
Elsewhere, I have discussed such alternatives as bar grading of lawyers or cooperation with
publications that produce neutral lawyer evaluations. Zacharias, supra note 5, at 631-40.
105. See, e.g., Zacharias, supra note 5, at 634-37 (discussing ways in which the bar might
assist potential clients in comparing the qualifications of lawyers at the retainer stage of
representation).
106. See id. at 624-30 (analyzing the obligations of lawyers to prospective clients).
107. See id. at 631-34 (discussing possible grading mechanisms).
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If, however, clients are most concerned with obtaining information about
lawyers attitudes, approaches, aggressiveness, and willingness to circumvent
professional constraints, that presents normative issues for the bar to resolve.
As a practical matter, collecting objective information about these
characteristics for lawyers across the board can be difficult. More importantly,
the bar may not want clients to emphasize, or even know about, some or all of
these characteristics. If some clients have access to reputations that provide the
information but other clients do not, the bar may need to consider creating
counter-incentives to developing particular types of reputations-either by
increasing rule enforcement against certain categories of lawyers or by
reformulating rules that allow such reputations to develop.
The bar may, alternatively, simply wish to downplay the importance of
reputations regarding lawyer approaches for fear that highlighting the issues
will undermine ideals of objectivity contained in the professional codes. At one
level, the bar might prefer to accept the existence of reputations for
nonobjective behavior among communities of sophisticated clients, but to
remain silent where other communities of clients are affected. An empirical
investigation might, however, suggest that unsophisticated clients also are
influenced by reputations for extreme client-centered lawyering, yet rely mostly
on inaccurate manufactured reputations that lead such clients not to the best
lawyers (in any sense), but rather to lawyers who advertise in ways that appeal.
Under this scenario, the bar arguably should strike the balance in favor of
supporting alternative accurate information sources rather than hoping the
problem confines itself.
To the extent the bar is able to educate clients about the significance of
client-centered behavior and facilitate clients' ability to identify lawyers'
reputations for this behavior, code drafters reasonably might consider
deregulation orjustify limited enforcement of the rules. In other words, when
lawyers have incentives to act in a client-centered fashion even without the
rules, then the importance of client-centered rules is diminished.
The above analysis suggests, again, that before pursuing any course, the
bar needs information about how reputation information is provided and used.
How much do the mechanisms vary among categories of clients and from case
to case? Would the information particular categories of clients desire change if
the clients themselves were educated better (by the bar or by lawyers required
to provide particular information at the outset)? Would what clients want and
what lawyers are willing to offer in order to compete for business change if the
rules were reoriented?
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C. Obtaining Reputation Evidence
This Article has noted four areas of information about lawyers that may be
relevant to clients and regulators: qualifications (including training and
experience), competence, professionalism, and aggressiveness. The first
consists of objective information that bar organizations and other evaluators
(e.g., publications about lawyers) can easily obtain.
Competence is a more subjective factor. Any rating of, or reputation for,
competence should refer not only to innate ability-which may be determined
in part by a lawyer's qualifications-but also to past performance. It also must
place a lawyer within a group of competing lawyers that practice in the
particular field of law. Gauging and reporting on past performance can be
tricky, in part because the professional rules limit lawyers' ability to identify
their own specialties 0 8 and to draw conclusions from results in previous
cases.l°9
Nevertheless, it would be possible for the bar, with the help of the courts,
to develop a rating system, if only for some areas of practice." 10 At least for
litigators, results in past cases can be measured statistically."' Admittedly,
results in individual cases do not necessarily translate to future results. It may
be difficult to code the nature of cases and define which results represent true
victories. Yet, even averaged results probably would be more reliable than the
108. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.4 (limiting claims of specialization
to lawyers admitted to practice before the United States Patent and Trademark Office, admiralty
lawyers, and those certified by a state authority or an organization accredited by the American
Bar Association); CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1-400(D) (6) (1997) (forbidding a lawyer
from claiming that he or she is a "certified specialist" unless the lawyer has been certified by the
State Board of Legal Specialization); N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.4 (2003) (allowing
lawyers to communicate fields of practice, but limiting claims of specialization to lawyers who
have received certification from the North Carolina State Bar, state bar-approved organizations,
or organizations accredited by the American Bar Association).
109. See, e.g., FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-7.2 (b) (1) (B) (2006) (prohibiting any
reference to past successes or results obtained); IND. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.2(d) (2)
(2005) (prohibiting legal advertising from containing information based on past performances);
James P. George, Civil Law, Procedure, and Private International Law: Access to Justice,
Costs, and Legal Aid, 54 Am. J. COMP. L. 293, 311 n.57 (Supp. 2006) (citing the ABA Model
Rules limiting claims of past successes as an example of good legal advertising regulation);
Moss, supra note 34, at 611 (describing Texas' prohibition on using information about past
performances); Deborah Rhode, Access to Justice: Connecting Principles to Practice, 17 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICs 369, 415 (2004) (describing the traditional bias against allowing advertising of
past performance by attorneys).
110. See, e.g., Zacharias, supra note 5, at 637-38 (discussing possible rating systems).
111. See generally LexisNexis, California, Jury Verdicts and Settlements Combined
Database, www.lexis.com; Westlaw, California, Jury Verdict and Settlement Summaries
Database, www.westlaw.com (search directory for LRPCA-JV database).
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results lawyers themselves refer to when manufacturing reputation-
particularly if the categories of cases from which the averaged results are culled
are carefully delimited. 12  Additionally, evaluations by adversaries and
presiding judges could be collected and factored into lawyer ratings. A state
bar willing to recognize specializations also could administer periodic
examinations that might prove relevant.
Professionalism, because it is an elusive term," 3 would need to be well-
defined before a bar could attempt to collect information about it. At one level,
the notion of professionalism may refer only to each lawyer's record of prior
discipline and malpractice verdicts-objective information that some bar
associations already collect' 14 and can easily make public. If an evaluating
body deems it important to collect information regarding lawyers'-or
particular categories of lawyers'-reputation for civility or cooperation among
regulators (e.g., the SEC) and courts, the regulators and courts would first need
to be willing to develop an unbiased rating methodology.
Lawyer aggressiveness or client-centeredness, of course, is the most
subjective factor-and the hardest to rate. Lawyers would not be willing to rate
themselves objectively. If the information is to be published, lawyers also
would have personal competitive interests in the way they evaluate other
attorneys. Manufactured reputation evidence-what lawyers say publicly about
themselves-is equally likely to be useless. An evaluating body attempting to
identify lawyers' earned reputations thus would need to solicit opinions of past
clients on how their lawyers behaved, together with the opinions ofjudges and
regulatory adversaries who dealt with those attorneys, and attempt a composite
evaluation-similar to the evaluation ofjudicial candidates by bar committees.
Identifying neutral references would prove especially problematic with respect
to nonlitigating lawyers; the process probably would of necessity depend on
information about client identities provided by the lawyers themselves. In any
112. Thus, for example, it is important both to explain past results in terms of how they
came about (e.g., through trials, quick settlements, protracted settlements, or default judgments)
and in terms of the nature and complexity of the merits.
113. See Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism, supra note 78, at 1307 (describing the
various conceptualizations of professionalism and authorities).
114. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6086.1 (Westlaw 2006) (mandating that hearings
and records of disciplinary proceedings before the State Bar Court be made public); FLORIDA'S
BAR STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS § 1.2 (1986) (mandating that "ultimate
disposition of lawyer discipline should be public"); PA. RULES OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT
R. 402(I) (2006) (requiring communication of public discipline of attorneys to the National
Lawyer Regulatory Data Bank of the American Bar Association); cf Lexis Nexis, California
Jury Verdicts and Settlements, Combined Database, www.lexis.com (search for "legal
malpractice") (displaying California's legal malpractice jury verdicts and settlements).
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event, soliciting and assessing references for all lawyers would be a resource-
intensive process, akin to the evaluation of applications for admission to the
bar.
D. Publicizing Reputation Information
Suppose that the bar has undertaken an empirical inquiry and determined
that certain kinds of information about lawyers-about their qualifications,
quality, aggressiveness, or professionalism-plays a significant role in the
hiring and use of particular categories of lawyers. Gathering such information
and rating lawyers on these bases would have significant effects on the
demographics of the bar. Lawyers rated highly on the qualification and
competence scales could charge a premium, while lesser lawyers might be
driven out of business. That seems appropriate. Potential clients should know
what they are paying for.
Moreover, rating lawyers on the basis of their history of compliance with
professional and judicial mandates may provide some meaningful information
for the regulators of lawyers. Lawyers' history of skirting the rules might
attract some customers but at a cost of regulatory and judicial trust. This, in
turn, might cause lawyers to hesitate to develop the reputations for
aggressiveness that they might be happy to develop if only sophisticated clients
could access the reputations.
Nevertheless, it is quite possible that publicizing information regarding
aggressiveness and professionalism would further a race to the bottom, in
which lawyers hoping to compete for business among clients in the know
would have significant incentives to assume the most client-centered
approaches. Our analysis suggests that that is nothing new in fields of law in
which clients already have access to reputation information. Bar involvement
in disseminating reputation evidence might, however, introduce the same
phenomenon into areas of law in which client ignorance served to promote the
more objective lawyering anticipated by the professional rules.
On the assumption that it is somehow inequitable to hide information from
some clients and deprive them of useful reputation information that wealthier or
more sophisticated clients can obtain, how might society respond to the
negative effects of widely available reputation information? We have already
noted that some rules-particularly permissive rules and those that place
control of choices in lawyers' hands-might need to be rewritten to take more
realistic account of lawyers' incentives. More broadly, however, the reality
regarding reputation information suggests that professional rules-or some
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professional rules-are archaic because they are too easily circumvented and do
not impose sufficient sanctions to provide real deterrence. Rather than using
professional regulation to limit external regulation, it may be time for the bar to
acknowledge that enforceable external regulation is necessary to produce the
behavior that society wants of lawyers." 5 Thus, for example, one mightjustify
the recent SEC Sarbanes-Oxley regulations not on the basis that they make
more theoretical sense than existing ethics provisions governing organizational
lawyers, but rather on the basis that only overbroad, prophylactic, and
enforceable requirements can counteract lawyers' competitive instincts.
In considering possible regulatory reactions to the effects of reputation
information, it is always important to separate those effects that generally might
be deemed positive from those that are destructive. It is good for clients and
society for individuals to hire the best available lawyers-those of the highest
qualifications and competence at a given price-because that helps the legal
system work in its intended fashion. Legal ethics regulators have never been
ashamed to acknowledge that the concepts of loyalty to clients and the
recognition of systemic and third party interests both are important and often in
tension. Lawyers' desires for varying kinds of reputation thus are not
surprising. It is only lawyers' willingness to cede some of their gatekeeping
responsibilities 1 6 and to use reputation as a signal to clients of that willingness
that society might wish to counteract.
Unfortunately, the possible methods of counteracting the negative effects
in this context are limited. They include removing lawyers' options (i.e.,
rewriting the rules), providing counter-incentives (i.e., enforcing existing
prohibitions, adopting or turning to other enforceable prohibitions, or
increasing sanctions), providing rewards for lawyers who act appropriately, and
educating persons who can counteract the conduct (e.g., adversaries and
regulators). So long as the codes support a range of professional conduct, one
can expect market forces to provide lawyers with reasons to act in the best
interests of those who pay for their services.
Moreover, because lawyers operate in a variety of fields and interact with
a variety of participants in the legal system, it is a mistake to act as if all
lawyers are alike. 17 To be effective, professional regulation must be
115. Cf. Christian Seibert, Rethinking Professional Regulation, 2007 ECON. AFF. 77, 79
(2007) (arguing for "removing the monopoly status of professional regulators [including the
bar] and introducing competitive regulation").
116. See Zacharias, supra note 53, at 1390-98 (cataloguing lawyers' various gatekeeping
functions).
117. Cf Zacharias, supra note 63, at 838-40 (discussing examples of ways in which
professional regulation assumes lawyers to be fungible).
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contextual-acknowledge that different categories of lawyers may "feature their
own distinctive structures, incentives, pressures, and dilemmas."" 8 A focus on
learning more about reputations and their significance can help code drafters
contextualize regulation better.' 9 At the same time, it may highlight the limits
of regulation itself--demonstrating that the enforcement of generalized ideals is
beyond the capacity of the self-regulatory regime. 
2 0
V. Conclusion
This Article began with a reference to the differences between my
perspective and that of a colleague regarding the effectiveness of professional
rules. In economic terms, my colleague is correct: When lawyers in a
competitive situation must choose between implementing (maybe even
obeying) professional ideals and satisfying a client, there is good chance that
the ideals will be set aside. In the converse situation, in which client interests
coincide with the import of the rules, the rules may not be necessary at all. To
the extent clients know what they want and lawyers can signal to clients their
willingness to provide the desired service, the influence of professional rules-
particularly hortatory rules-is minimized.
This Article's analysis, however, has attempted to cast doubt on the
universality of these conclusions. The conclusions are based on a number of
factual premises typical of economic analysis: Clients know what they want,
clients will insist upon receiving what they want, and lawyers and clients
communicate about those desires on a routine basis. The Article has suggested
that many individual clients are unable to identify their own needs or lawyers
who will cater to them. The Article also has suggested a number of reasons
why the assumed communication simply does not occur directly, among
sophisticated or unsophisticated clients. The phenomena to which my
colleague refers can proceed only when reputation about lawyers serves as an
effective proxy for direct communication about lawyers' willingness to follow
the rules.
How routinely reputation serves as that proxy is an empirical issue, one
which both my colleague and I can agree is significant. Whether society can or
118. Regan, supra note 19, at 564.
119. See generally Zacharias & Green, supra note 60 (discussing different
conceptualizations of lawyers' roles, based on distinctions in lawyers' practices).
120. See Gilson, supra note 90, at 872 (discussing ways in which demand-side (i.e., client-
focused) economic analysis of legal professionalism highlights the fact that "there may be very
real limits on what the profession alone can do to arrest the decline of legal professionalism").
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should rely on professional rules to shape lawyers behavior, especially outward-
regarding behavior, depends on whether access to the key types of reputation
information are readily available to clients. One can speculate that different
kinds of clients are in better positions to obtain information and exert control,
but it is not obvious that this will always be true. Identifying the evidence
should inform rulemakers about the value of particular regulations, disciplinary
authorities about where resources should be focused, and external lawmakers
about whether it makes sense to rely on or defer to the professional rules. It
also can help the bar decide whether it should take steps to facilitate the
dissemination of reputation information or take steps to counteract it.
This Article's focus on reputation and its call for empirical inquiry, of
course, is only a preliminary step. That step, however, is an important one.
Although a few scholars have addressed the impact of reputation, they have
confined themselves to very limited spheres of representation-typically areas
of corporate law. 12' These scholars' insights are valuable, yet it would be a
mistake for regulation to develop on the assumption that the insights are
applicable across the board. Like the perspectives my colleague and I have
developed, the insights are informed by speculations borne of personal,
potentially idiosyncratic, experience. Only by equipping itself to assess the
underlying assumptions of the economic analysis-by undertaking a rigorous
look at how lawyers and clients actually behave, or are likely to behave-can
the bar hope to produce realistic rules.
121. For discussions of the effect of reputation in corporate law, see generally Gilson,
supra note 91; Okomato, supra note 91; and Zacharias, supra note 7.
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